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Distribution of Marital Assets in Community Property
Jurisdictions: Equitable Doesn't Equal Equal
James R. Ratner*
The hallmark of an American community property system, in
contrast to common law jurisdictions, is that community property
is owned in undivided one-half ownership by each spouse.I In the
event of a divorce, the undivided ownership interest needs to be
divided. At first glance, it might sound simple-divide each asset
50/50-but nothing is ever simple when it comes to marital
property. Although California, 2 Louisiana 3 and New Mexico
require an equal distribution of the community assets, other
community property jurisdictions, using various terms, call for
equitable distribution of the community assets.5 But what is an
Copyright 2011, by JAMES R. RATNER.
Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of
Law. A version of this paper was presented at the LSU Law School Symposium
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1. Eight states have community property regimes: Arizona, California,
Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. GRACE GANz
BLUMBERG, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 5 (5th ed. 2007). In those
jurisdictions "[c]ommunity property is owned equally by the spouses from the
moment of acquisition." Id. at 6. Wisconsin's statutes, WIs. STAT. ANN. §§
766.001-766.97 (West, Westlaw through July 2011 amendments), patterned
after the Uniform Marital Property Act, 9A U.L.A. 103 (1998), maintain most
attributes of a community property system, including the attribute of a present
undivided ownership interest in marital assets generated by either spouse during
the marriage and has been described as "the ninth American community
*

property state." WILLIAM A. REPPY & CYNTHIA A. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY
PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (7th ed. 2009). In common law states,

spouses own property during the marriage indistinguishably from how they
would own it if there were no marital community. BLUMBERG, supra, at 6.
2. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West, Westlaw through 2011 amendments).
"The California norm is equal division of each asset," BLUMBERG, supra note 1,
at 546-47, but has exceptions when community liabilities are greater than the
total of community assets, and has a statutory exception for personal injury
recoveries, CAL. FAM. CODE § 2603 (West, Westlaw through 2011
amendments), and "[w]here economic circumstances warrant." CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 2601 (West, Westlaw through 2011 amendments).
3. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2336 (2011).
4. Ruggles v. Ruggles, 860 P.2d 182, 192 (N.M. 1993) (articulating "the
rule requiring equal division of the community property on divorce").
5. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-712 (West, Westlaw through July 2011
amendments); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.150 (West, Westlaw through 2010
amendments); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001 (West, Westlaw through 2011
amendments); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080 (West, Westlaw through
Aug. 2011 amendments); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (West, Westlaw
through 2011 amendments); REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 1, at 351. Wisconsin
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equitable distribution, and how does it differ from an equal
distribution?
Arizona is a representative example of a community property
jurisdiction with a divorce distribution instruction that all
community assets, although owned equally by the divorcing couple
in undivided one-half ownership, are to be divided "equitably,
although not necessarily in kind . . . without regard to marital

misconduct." The statute need not be read as authorizing
meaningful departures from a 50/50 split of the net worth of the
community. "[E]quitably, although not necessarily in kind" could
mean only that it is unnecessary to divide each asset 50/50 and that
an overall distribution scheme of the various assets and liabilities
to one or the other spouse need not result in a distribution that is
equal down to the last penny. Such an interpretation of "equitably,
although not necessarily in kind," offers useful flexibility
compared to a requirement of perfectly equal distribution. Equal
may imply a more cumbersome 50/50 split for each asset.7 The less
constrained construction establishes an optimal structure in which
a divorce court has extensive discretion and flexibility concerning
how to divide various community assets and liabilities to arrive at a
50/50 split.8 This construction need not achieve a numerically

also statutorily authorizes equitable distribution at divorce. Wis. STAT. ANN. §
767.61 (West, Westlaw through July 2011 amendments). California provides for
equitable division of community debts when marital debts exceed marital assets.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2622 (West, Westlaw through 2011 amendments).
6. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-318(A) (West, Westlaw through 2011
amendments). The statute also contains a typical authorization for adjustment in
the event of management and control fraud or serious squandering or dissipation
while divorce was pending: "This section does not prevent the court from
considering ... excessive or abnormal expenditures, destruction, concealment or
fraudulent disposition of community, joint tenancy and other property held in
common." Id. at § 25-318(C).
7. California, which has a requirement of "equal" distribution, CAL. FAM.
CODE. § 2550 (West, Westlaw through 2011 amendments), and a norm that each
asset be divided 50/50, has adjusted its structure to avoid some of the harshness
associated with that norm, as it can force economically undesirable liquidation
of assets, including the custodial home, or other economic impairment. See CAL.
FAM. CODE § 2601 (West, Westlaw through 2011 amendments) ("Where
economic circumstances warrant, the court may award an asset of the
community estate to one party on such conditions as the court deems proper to
effect a substantially equal division of the community estate."); In re Marriage
of Brigden, 145 Cal. Rptr. 716 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
8. Because there are many different ways to arrive at a roughly 50/50 split
of the overall community assets and liabilities, requiring numerical perfection
would eliminate much of the flexibility and regress in the direction of
liquidating the assets, as cash provides a vehicle for a perfect numerical split.
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perfect division, but at the same time does not authorize any
meaningful departure from a 50/50 overall split of the community
worth. In such a regime, divorce settlement, the mechanism by
which the vast majority of divorce property arrangements are
achieved,9 would be negotiated in the shadow of uncertainty about
valuation and about the final resting place of various assets, but no
uncertainty concerning the shares.
Judges in community property jurisdictions who interpret
"equitably, although not necessarily in kind," however, are
reluctant to assign it a meaning of "roughly 50/50 in the overall
split." One reason for the reluctance may be that the judges feel
compelled to assign to the term equitable its well-known general
meaning in law: do the fairest thing given the circumstances.' 0
Common law equitable distribution jurisdictions, facing the
different distributional issue of how to divide separately owned
property," tend to use a broader concept of equitable, including
concepts of need and contribution, often rejecting even a
presumption of equal division.12 Community property equitable
distribution jurisdictions tend to follow along with the common
law version of an equitable distribution at divorce, seemingly
discounting the fact that what is being divided is property with
present equal ownership.13 In Arizona, for example, descriptions of
9. ELLMAN, KURTZ, WEITHORN, BIX, CZAPANSKIY, & EICHNER, FAMILY
LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 863-866 (5th ed. 2010).
10. See, e.g., Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 133
(1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("In legal systems . . . 'equitable' signals that
which is reasonable, fair, or appropriate. Dictionary definitions of 'equitable'
notably include among appropriate meanings: 'just and impartial,' American
Heritage Dictionary 622 (3d ed.1992); also 'dealing fairly and equally with all
concerned,' Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 421 (1983)."); ELLMAN
ET AL., supra note 9, at 336 ("'Equitable' is merely a four-syllable word for
'fair."').
11. REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 1, at 12.
12. Id.; BLUMBERG, supra note 1, at 6 ("In modem common law states,
variable distribution is the norm . . . ."); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS

§ 4.09,

Reporter's Notes cmt. a (2002) (citing Luedke v. Luedke, 487 N.E.2d 133 (Ind.
1985), as an example of an equitable distribution jurisdiction "resisting adoption
of an initial presumption" of equal distribution) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].
13. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Urbana, 195 P.3d 959, 964 (Wash. Ct. App.
2008) (explaining that an equitable distribution requires "fairness" rather than
"mathematical precision," should be based on a wide variety of factors, and can
justify a substantially unequal distribution); McNabney v. McNabney, 782 P.2d
1291, 1296 (Nev. 1989) ("A fifty-fifty rule as a rule of law is inherently
inconsistent with our statute.. . .Very frequently justice and equity will require a
divorce court to adjust community property in an unequal manner . . . .");

Phillips v. Phillips, 75 S.W.3d 564 (Tex. App. 2002) (divisions of community
property can depart from equality by substantial amounts at the discretion of the
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a strong presumption of an equal division of the community
property at divorcel 4 have increasingly given way to a use of
"equitable" in a broader sense to justify substantially unequal
distributions.' 5
The use of a broad, standardless version of "equitable" division
of the community assets and liabilities is unfortunate. It allows
divorce courts to evaluate the respective "contribution" efforts of
each spouse in generating community property or liability and to
give one spouse a greater share based on the evaluation. This
undermines two key useful features of modem community
property regimes: undivided ownership of community assets that
takes place at ori inal acquisition rather than being deferred until
divorce or death, and equal or joint management and control of
all community assets.17 The evaluation of "contribution" and the
use of unequal contributions to justify unequal division also
inevitably leads to consideration of subtle "fault"-type matters,
despite the statutory admonition otherwise. The combination of
these effects undermines efficient, cost-effective divorce
settlements by injecting needless uncertainty and the prospect of
fault-based inquiry and proof into the process.

trial court, which may weigh many factors in reaching its decision, including
fault, although fault cannot be used to punish.); BLUMBERG, supra note 1, at 6
(in the five community property states that do not require equal distribution, the
community portion each spouse receives "is variable and subject to the divorce
court's power of equitable distribution.").
14. Hatch v. Hatch, 547 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Ariz. 1976) (en banc) ("In the
absence of sound reason, each spouse must receive substantial equivalents.").
Reppy & Samuel describe Arizona's rule to be one of "equal absent
'compelling' reasons" and cite In re Marriage of Berger, 680 P.2d 1217 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1983). REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 1, at 351. Berger, however, uses
the "sound reason" standard of Hatch.Berger, 680 P.2d at 1229-30.
15. See infra Part I.A-C (discussing Toth v. Toth, 946 P.2d 900 (Ariz. 1997)
(en banc), Kelly v. Kelly 9 P.3d 1046 (Ariz. 2000), and Flower v. Flower, 225
P.3d 588 (Ariz. 2010)).
16. BLUMBERG, supra note 1, at 7 ("[T]he notion of a spouse's present equal
interest in marital property has considerable symbolic force. It clearly announces
that spouses are understood to contribute equally to the family without regard to
actual division of labor. It dignifies the work of the homemaker, tends to rectify
sex-related inequality of employment opportunity, and recognizes that the
couple may make unequal human capital investment in the spouses.").
17. The basic rule in all community property jurisdictions except Texas is
that each spouse has equal management and control over each community asset.
Some assets, most notably community real property, require a joint management
and control decision. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 1, at 257, 267; see also
Susan Westerberg Prager, The Persistence of Separate Property Concepts in
California's Community Property System, 24 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1976)
(discussing the importance of equal management and control).
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This essay offers a critical assessment of judicial conclusions
that statutorily-mandated equitable distribution of community
property permits a divorce distribution that substantially deviates
from an equal split. My conclusion is that the departures do more
damage than good and should not be authorized. An equal division
of the community worth in every case is preferable to a system that
permits unequal divisions. The organization of the essay is as
follows. In Part I, I discuss three Arizona cases that use a statutory
instruction to divide community property "equitably, although not
necessarily in kind" to justify significant departures from a 50/50
split of the worth of the community. The cases exemplify the use
in community property jurisdictions of a broad notion of
"equitable" distribution and demonstrate that inquiries concerning
what is equitable potentially involve inquiry concerning marital
fault. In Part II, I explain why the broad approach to "equitable"
demonstrated by Part I is undesirable. I assess possible advantages
of the broad approach, including the opportunity to adjust a
distribution based on spousal contribution or spousal need,
especially in the context of marital debt, and explain the reasons
why the advantages are more than outweighed by disadvantages. In
Part III, I focus on one aspect of carving out the proper rule for
distribution of community assets at divorce: the reality that much
of the case law makes rules on facts that are far from typical. I
conclude that the perhaps inevitable desire judges may have to do
the right thing in a divorce posing perverse facts has the potential
to undermine not only divorce settlements concerning normal
facts, but the entire community property system.

I. UNEQUAL

IS EQUITABLE

Several recent Arizona cases have grappled with the meaning
of "equitable" in the divorce distribution statute including Toth v.
Toth," Kelly v. Kelly," and Flower v. Flower. The combination
of these cases offers divorce court judges discretion to contemplate
substantial departures from a 50/50 split of the community worth.
A. Toth v. Toth-A 90/10 split is equitable
If the facts of Toth were posed as a law school exam question
or class hypothetical, students might respond with: "Oh, people
don't really do that sort of thing. You are just making it up so that
18. Toth, 946 P.2d 900.
19. Kelly, 9 P.3d 1046.
20. Flower, 225 P.3d 588.
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you can ask the question." The facts are simple, entertaining, and
effectively pose the question of what "equitable" means in the
context of the divorce distribution statute.
Anthony Toth, 87, met Gloria Snyder, 62, at a senior citizens
dance and married a year later. 2 1 The day after the marriage,
Anthony took $140,000 of his separate property and purchased a
home in a retirement community for the couple to live in, putting
title in both of their names in Joint Tenancy with Right of
Survivorship (JTWRS). 22 Within three weeks, however, the Toths
began to experience marital difficulty. The trial court's finding of
facts vaguely alluded to possible reasons for the difficulty:
"Anthony moved out of the marital bedroom," 23 and Gloria may
not have made a "good faith effort to create a viable marriage." 24
A month after the marriage, Anthony filed for an annulment.2 5
There was only one possible community2 6 asset: the home. Gloria
sought half the worth, $70,000.27 The trial court, however, noting
the parties' differing ages, needs, health, and income, and noting
the lack of evidence that Gloria made a good faith effort to make
the marriage work, concluded Gloria was entitled only to
$15,000.28 The division of the entire community was roughly 89%
to Anthony and 11% to Gloria, a radical departure from a 50/50
division. The court of appeals, reading meager case law and the
statutory language, reversed, concluding that a departure from a

21.
22.

Toth, 946 P.2d at 901.
Id.

23.

Id.

24. Id. at 904.
25. Id at 901. It took more than a year from the filing until the final decree
of divorce, which means that the divorce process took longer to effectuate than
their entire relationship, let alone their marriage. Id.
26. In Arizona, JTWRS property is divided at divorce indistinguishably
from all community property. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (West, Westlaw
through 2011 amendments). This is fairly typical of community property
jurisdictions, although there is controversy about it. See generally James R.
Ratner, Community Property, Right of Survivorship, and Separate Property
Contributions to Marital Assets: An Interplay, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 993 (1999).
Despite the statutory language, Arizona unhelpfully treats JTWRS differently
from community property in certain non-death respects, including authorizing
separate property reimbursement for contributions to JTWRS when
reimbursement is not permitted for the identical contribution to community
property, and authorizing voluntary or involuntary severing, unavailable without
joinder of both spouses if the property were community property rather than
JTWRS. Id.
27. Toth, 946 P.2d at 901.
28. Id at 901, 904.
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50/50 split was justified only in the event of fraud excessive or
abnormal expenditures, destruction, or concealment.2§
The Arizona Supreme Court sided with the trial court view.3 0
According to the Arizona Supreme Court, the legislature's use of
the word "equitable" rather than the word "equal" signaled the
legislature's desire to give divorce courts authority to decide in
each case what constitutes an equitable distribution.3 1 A divorce
court has broad discretion concerning the basis for its decision as
to what division of the community assets is equitable, and is not
limited to only spousal conduct pertaining to the specific assets and
liabilities to be divided. The statute "does not purport to define the
universe of relevance," 32 which means that the source of funds
used to generate a community asset, the duration of the marriage,
the ages of the parties, the health of the parties, the income of the
parties, the needs of the parties, and the parties' "personal
situations" all can factor into a decision concerning what division
is equitable.3 3 "'Equitable' means just that-it is a concept of
fairness dependent upon the facts of particular cases." 34 Although
the starting point in most cases may be that an equal distribution
will be the "most equitable," 35 there may be sound reasons to
depart from a substantially equal division, and a divorce court has
discretion concerning that decision.3 6
In the view of the Arizona Supreme Court majority, the facts
presented "sound reason to divide the Toths' property unequally"37
because the asset was generated solely by Anthony. 38 Although
Gloria did not engage in marital misconduct,3 9 she failed to
contribute to the asset or to the community.4 0 "In this case, equal is
not equitable. ....'[I]n all fairness .

.

. the propert

be awarded [in large measure] to one spouse.

. .. should ...

...

29. Id. at 901.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 903.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 904.
34. Id. at 903.
35. Id. The statute does not require the "most equitable" distribution,
however-only that the trial judge distribute the assets "equitably." ARIZ. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (West, Westlaw through 2011 amendments).
36. Toth, 946 P.2d at 903.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. ("This is not a determination of fault; why the marriage dissolved is
irrelevant.").
40. Id.
41. Id. at 903-904 (quoting Barbara J. Torrez, Arizona Property Division
Upon MaritalDissolution, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 411, 437).
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Toth thus stands for the proposition that the statute's
instruction to divide all community and other jointly owned marital
property equitably at divorce authorizes close to a 90/10 split in
favor of a husband, and that a divorce court can base its
determination that such a split is equitable on the following facts:
(1) the wife failed to generate or contribute to the generation of
community assets, while the husband generated the community
assets in question; (2) the wife may not have contributed to the
marital relationship; (3) the duration of the marriage was short; and
(4) the parties were of different ages, with different needs, health,
income, and personal situations. Although the most prominent fact
is that the marriage lasted less than a month,4 2 the decision is based
on the meaning of "equitable," rather than on the duration of the
marriage, and fails to address the level of importance of the
factors, as is borne out by subsequent Arizona cases. 4 3 Thus, Toth
stands as an invitation for any lawyer with a divorce client
interested in a greater-than-50% share of the worth of the
community to develop analogous facts justifying a similar result.
One problem with the Toth result is that virtually every lawyer
with a divorce client will respond to the invitation.
B. Kelly v. Kelly-A Tale of Two Retirement Plans andFederal
Law as the Source ofInequity
During a 13-year marriage, Byron and Corinne Kelly both
worked for the federal government." Corrine's retirement plan
was in the Federal Employees Retirement System-under that
system, a portion of her retirement was to be paid out through
Social Security. 45 Byron, in contrast, was enrolled in the Civil
Service Retirement System, which, in effect, precluded social
security-if Byron took social security, it would reduce his
retirement benefits.46
When they divorced, Byron's retirement plan was
characterized as community property to be divided between the

42. Id. at 903 ("The marriage lasted two weeks, allowing no time for a
marital relationship to develop, or for other equities to come into play.").
43. In Kelly v. Kelly, 9 P.3d 1046 (Ariz. 2000), discussed infra Part I.B,
duration was not relevant. In Flower v. Flower, 225 P.3d 588 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2010), duration was a factor, but the duration was a year, and Toth was viewed
as not restricted to marriages with a duration of less than a month. See infra Part

I.C.
44. Kelly, 9 P.3d at 1047.

45. Id.
46. Id.
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spouses. 47 Much of Corinne's plan, however, was her separate
property, not divisible at divorce.4 8 Corinne was given the Social
Security portion of her plan outright because the federal statutes
that grant the benefit directly to the earning spouse have been
interpreted to preempt state marital property laws that characterize
social security as a community retirement plan.49
Byron was understandably unhappy that his entire pension was
divisible community property while much of Corrine's was not. As
it turned out, the Arizona Supreme Court did not like it, either.50
The Arizona Supreme Court chose not to confront head-on the
preemption analysis that forced the differing treatments for
identical-appearing assets, even though preemption was not an
automatic result.5 Nor did the Arizona Supreme Court consider a
remedy that might have been compatible with preemption-the
alternative of giving the community a reimbursement interest
based on the opportunity cost loss associated with Corrine's plan.52
Instead, the Arizona Supreme Court employed Toth's expansive
interpretation of "equitably, although not necessarily in kind"'53 to
justify a result borrowed from a common law equitable distribution
jurisdiction: 54 the value of Byron's retirement plan that would have
47. Id. ("In 1978, Congress amended the Civil Service Retirement Act ...
to allow state courts to treat such payments as marital or community property.")
48. Id.
49. Id. ("Social security bears many characteristics of a pension and would
ordinarily be considered community property . . . . Federal law, however,

prohibits such benefits from being subject to 'execution, levy, attachment,
garnishment, or other legal process,' and declares that they are not 'transferable
or assignable.' 42 U.S.C. § 407(a). This provision has generally been interpreted
to prevent social security from being divided by state courts at divorce.

. .

. We

agree, and view this entitlement as the separate property of the participating
spouse.")
50. Id. at 1048.
51. The United States Supreme Court has not directly confronted the
question of whether the Social Security Act preempts community property
treatment. This issue has been litigated in state courts only, with conflicting
results concerning the extent to which social security benefits can permissibly
influence the division of marital assets at divorce. See generally Stanley V.
Welsh and Franki J. Hargrave, Social Security Benefits at Divorce: Avoiding
Federal Preemption to Allow Equitable Division of Property in Divorce, 20 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 285 (2007).
52. Id.
53. Kelly, 9 P.3d at 1048 (describing Toth as deciding that a trial judge has
considerable discretion to make an unequal division of community property
based on "'a concept of fairness dependent upon the facts of particular cases'
and "relying on this 'concept of fairness"' as the basis for authorizing a
significant departure from an equal distribution of the community property).
54. Id. (relying on Cornbleth v. Combleth, 580 A.2d 369 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990)).
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been his social security benefit "had he participated in that plan
during the marriage" was distributed to Byron as his separate
property.5 5 The import of the Arizona Supreme Court decision was
that Corrine's share of the community property was not
unacceptably reduced inconsistent with federal law, because she
was not entitled to a 50% share of the worth of Byron's community
property retirement plan, only an "equitable" share. The actual
result, however, was a division of the community worth in a
manner other than 50/50, with Byron getting significantly more,
justified because Byron had generated the asset in question and
Corrine had generated less retirement to the community. The result
and the justification in Kelly thus reinforced and expanded Toth's
proposition that the word "equitable" in the divorce distribution
statute authorizes a divorce court to divide the worth of the
community unequally whenever the trial judge's sense of fairness
dictates an unequal division.56
Kelly's use of Pennsylvania case law to support its departure
from a 50/50 division of the community worth also reinforces the
55. Id. at 1048. This result enabled the Arizona Supreme Court to say the
result was faithful to federal law because the result involved neither valuing and
dividing Corrine's social security nor giving Byron an offset in other community
property. It is true that Corrine's federally protected social security was not
divided. It is also true that her social security was not de facto reduced by the
Arizona Supreme Court because the amount given to Byron as his separate
property was based on the worth of Byron's retirement plan rather than an offset
of the worth of Corrine's plan. The distinctions seem somewhat disingenuous,
however, because Byron was given a greater than 50% share of the total
community property only because Corrine's comparable retirement plan was her
separate property.
56. The decision tried to limit its import by indicating that it was limited to
its facts. Id. at 1048. The facts are unusual, as both worked for the federal
government. One had a Social-Security-based retirement plan and the other did
not. The "limited-to-its-facts" tactic may not be particularly successful, as the
key facts of Kelly, which are that what would have been a community asset was
invested in a federally granted benefit directed only to one of the spouses, are
not particularly unusual. A spouse seeking a greater than 50% share of the
community worth is likely to argue that Kelly's "equitable" departure is
appropriate whenever community assets are directed into social security or some
other federally granted benefit. Extensions of Kelly's expansive interpretation of
"equitably although not necessarily in kind" to justify a departure from a 50/50
division of the community have begun to occur outside of the context of each
spouse with a federal retirement plan. See Kohler v. Kohler, 118 P.3d 621 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2005) (indicating that, where one spouse made contributions to Social
Security through her private sector employment and a portion of the other
spouse's state Public Safety Personnel Retirement System contributions were in
lieu of Social Security contributions, a trial court is permitted to consider the
unfairness that community-earned contributions to social security will result in
separate property social security benefits for the private sector spouse as a basis
for dividing the community assets unequally).
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proposition that "equitable" division of community assets and
liabilities is not different from equitable division of marital assets
in common law jurisdictions. That proposition, however, ignores a
key difference. Divorce courts in community property jurisdictions
are dividing assets that have been owned in undivided 100%
ownership by both spouses since the moment the asset was
generated.57 In common law equitable-distribution jurisdictions,
the division is of assets owned individually by each of the
spouses. 58
C. Flower v. Flower-Are Motivationsfor MarriageRelevant to a
PropertySplit?
Toth and Kelly practically compel divorce lawyers to seek a
departure from a 50/50 split in favor of their client whenever one
or more of the following facts are present: (1) the client alone
generated community assets, (2) the other spouse can be argued to
not have contributed adequately to those assets, to the community
assets generally, or to the marital relationship, (3) the marriage was
short in duration or the marriage ended shortly after the assets in
question were generated, or (4) whenever standard well-settled law
yields a result that can be described as "inequitable" in some way.
Included in 2, 3, and 4 are invitations to make thinly disguised
"give my client more because he (or she) deserves it and the other
side doesn't" arguments. The very existence of Flower v. Flower59
exemplifies the willingness of lawyers to respond to the invitations
offered by Toth and Kelly. The result of Flower demonstrates the
inclination of Arizona trial court and appellate judges to simply
track the rules out of those cases without meaningful limitation.
Appellate judges appear willing to offer trial courts so much
discretion concerning decisions about "equitable" division of
community assets as to undermine meaningful appellate oversight
of those decisions.
The facts of Flower resemble those of Toth in certain respects.
Judy, age 55, married Norman, age 76.60 Shortly afterwards
Norman changed the title in his home to community property with
right of survivorship (CPWRS).61 The couple lived in the CPWRS
house for six months 62 and then moved into a house owned by
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

1, at 6.
Id.
225 P.3d 588 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010)
Id. at 590.
Id.
Id.
BLUMBERG, supra note
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Judy (for which there had been no title change).6 3 After a year of
marriage, Norman alleged that Judy never had a romantic interest
in him and only married him for financial motivations,64 and
sought annulment.6 5 The trial focused on the only significant
community asset, the CPWRS house. Norman argued that he had
given Judy a community property ownership interest in that home
through "misunderstanding, fraud, or coercion," but argued in the
alternative that an equitable distribution of the community property
required that he be awarded the CPWRS house outright as his
property. 66 Judy disputed Norman's factual allegations concerning
her motivation for marriage and argued the community worth,
which largely constituted the CPWRS house, should be split
50/50.67

The trial court denied an annulment 68 but concluded, citing
Toth, that it was obligated to consider the "overall issue of fairness
and equity" when dividing the community property.6 9 Pursuant to
that consideration, Norman was given the CPWRS house outright,
partly in recognition that "there was no effort, toil, or contribution
Judy
from the community to increase the property's value. ...
appealed, arguing that the significantly unequal property division
was an unwarranted extension of Toth,7 ' but the Court of Appeals
agreed with the trial court. 72 According to the Court of Appeals,
Toth instructed that the word "equitable" in the divorce distribution
63. Id. The couple made significant improvements to Judy's house while
living in Norman's house and moved into Judy's house when the improvements
were complete. Id. About half of the improvements to Judy's house appear to
have been funded by a home equity loan secured by the CPWRS property. Id.
64. Id.
6 5. Id
66. Id. at 590-91. The equity in the CPWRS house was approximately
$250,000 at the time of divorce. Id at 590.
67. Id. at 590-91. Arizona presumes all real property titled in both spouses'
names is community property regardless of whether the source of that property
was the separate property of one of the spouses. The presumption can be
overcome only by clear and convincing evidence of the lack of donative intent
by the originating spouse. See Sommerfield v. Sommerfield, 592 P.2d 771, 77374 (Ariz. 1979); Becchelli v. Becchelli, 508 P. 2d 59, 62-63 (Ariz. 1973).
68. Id. at 591. According to the court of appeals, the trial court judge
determined that a valid marriage existed by "reasoning that later-in-life
marriages are often entered into for reasons other than a sexual relationship,
such as companionship, and even if the Wife married Husband for financial
reasons, she still demonstrated genuine affection towards him as both parties had
suffered significant personal losses that may have brought them together." Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. The trial court also recognized that Judy's home was her "sole and
separate property free from any claims of the Husband." Id.
7 1. Id.
72. Id. at 596.
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statute required trial courts to consider "'fairness' on a case-bycase basis rather than relying upon per se rules."73 Further, the
court's notion of equitability required a "balancing [of] equities" 74
such that different courts "might reach different conclusions in
similar cases without abusing their discretion." 5 Accordingly,
when determining the appropriate division of the community
worth, a divorce court has wide discretion to consider not only the
source of the funds used to purchase or improve assets in
question7 6 but also "any factor that has bearing on the equitable
division of the marital property,"7 7 including "contributions made
by each spouse to the community, in whatever form."78 The trial
court's decision to divide the community assets unequally was thus
well within its discretion. Judy's lack of contribution to the
CPWRS house and her lack of general contribution to the marital
community,79 along with "a relatively short" marriage, justified the
unequal distribution in Norman's favor.80

II. THE DRAWBACKS

TO OPEN-ENDED EQUITABLE DISCRETION

Toth, Kelly and Flower, in the aggregate, seem to authorize an
"equitable distribution" regime that permits departures from a
50/50 split of the community worth based on the consideration of
many different factors, including contribution and need.
Contribution and need are both fundamental concepts employed by
divorce courts in common law equitable-distribution jurisdictions

73. Id. at 595.
74. Id. at 592.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 593.
77. Id. at 595.
78. Id. at 594.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 595. The Court of Appeals described Toth, in which the marriage
had been less than a month, as placing only "limited emphasis on the length of
marriage," and explicitly rejected the wife's argument that Toth authorized
departures from an equal division of the community worth result only for
marriages of less than a month. Id. at 595-56. The Court of Appeals concluded
that
in balancing the equities of property division . . . . while the legal
duration of the marriage was just over one year, the . . . Husband

moved out of the marital home less than eleven months after the
wedding, and ... the marital relationship was strained and deteriorating
[in] less than eight months .

. .

. By almost any account this would be

considered a short marriage, where there was insufficient time for other
equities to tip the scale in favor of substantially equal distribution.
Id. at 596.
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to arrive at a division of the marital assets and liabilities.81 Toth
and Flower vaguely involve need in the calculus, without any
specification of the appropriate weight and influence to be
assigned to need. Toth, Kelly, and Flower all implicate contribution
values by rewarding the spouse who generated the asset, and Toth
and Flower also stress the lack of contribution by the other spouse.
This regime offers little guidance concerning the following: how
and when to consider need, contribution, and other factors; how to
assign weight to each of the factors; the relative importance of
each factor; and the extent to which trial-judge discretion
concerning use of the factors is mandated or precluded.
The concept of dividing community assets and liabilities
unequally at divorce seems inconsistent with the essential
functions of community property regimes. The essence of
community property regimes is that they entitle a spouse to
undivided present ownership of all community assets, regardless of
which spouse generated the asset and the behavior of the spouse
during the marriage. Given this hallmark, one might assume that a
mandate of "equal" division of the presently owned property
would permeate the divorce distribution statutes of all community
property jurisdictions. Instead, "equal" rather than "equitable"
division apears to be the minority approach. Only California,8 2
explicitly undertake equal
and New Mexico'
Louisiana,
distribution, although several other community property
jurisdictions are often cited as effectuating a presumptively equal
system.8 5 As reflected in Wisconsin,8 6 which based its marital

81. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at § 4.09 cmt. a and Reporter's Notes
cmt. a. The ALI Principles conclude that the myriad factors used in equitable
distribution jurisdictions fall into two general categories: contribution, that is,
rewarding the one who generated the asset; and need, that is, giving more to the
one who has fewer post-divorce financial prospects. The principles also point
out that these two values inevitably conflict. Id.
82. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2601 (West 2010).
83. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2336 (2011).
84. Ruggles v. Ruggles, 860 P.2d 182, 192 (N.M. 1993).
85. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 1, at 351; ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note
12, at § 4.09, Reporter's Notes cmt. b (citing Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault:
New Directions in Divorce Refonn, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 6

(Steven Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990)).
86. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.61 (West, Westlaw through July 2011
amendments). Reflecting its roots in the Uniform Marital Property Act, 9A
U.L.A. 103 (1998), devised for both common law and community property
jurisdictions, this divorce distribution statute calls for equitable distribution
considering separate as well as community property.
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property system on the Uniform Marital Property Act, 87 equitable
rather than equal distribution at divorce lies at the intersection of
community property and common law jurisdictions, with many
common law states characterizing marital property, for divorce
distribution purposes, in a fashion quite similar to community
property jurisdictions, some even presuming a 50/50 split unless
there are compelling countervailing considerations. 89
For several interconnected reasons, however, an equal division
of the community worth is preferable to the formulation of
"equitable" promoted by the results and the analysis of Toth, Kelly
and Flower. Allowing divorce courts open-ended and largely
unreviewable equitable discretion concerning division of
community worth undermines horizontal equity, renders property
division at divorce a high-stakes judicial lottery, and likely raises
the costs of obtaining a divorce. Permitting divorce courts to
employ an open-ended, undefined concept of "need" to justify a
larger share for the one in need unacceptably undermines the
concept of community property ownership. At the same time,
allowing divorce courts to justify a larger share for the spouse who
generated community assets with an open-ended idea of
"contribution" is a frontal assault on the idea of community
property (as well as in conflict with the idea of justifying
departures from equal division on the basis of need). Authorizing
divorce courts to address marital debts with an open-ended
equitable calculation inevitably forces consideration of need and
contribution and undesirably implicates creditors in every divorce
in which there is debt. Perhaps most disturbing, the open-ended
formulation of equitable discretion re-injects a subtle but
substantial form of evaluating marital misconduct into the calculus
concerning asset division. It does so by permitting divorce courts
to contemplate whether a spouse was not married long enough to
contribute to the marital community or failed to make a genuine
contribution to the community, and in effect penalizes a spouse
who did not contribute adequately with a lesser share of the
community assets.
87. Howard S. Erlanger and June M. Weisberger, From Common Law
Property To Community Property: Wisconsin's Marital Property Act Four
Years Later, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 769, 770 (1990).
88. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at § 4.03, Reporter's Notes cmt. a.
89. Id. at Reporter's Notes cmt. b. It is ironic that in several common law
states, which do not attach marital property rights at the time of acquisition, but do
assign a presumption of equal division that can only be overcome by a compelling
reason, the likelihood of equal division may be greater than in several community
property states that confer property rights at acquisition but permit equitable
distribution concepts to justify departures from an equal split more easily.
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A. Open-ended equitable distributionof community assets
undermines horizontal equity.
A divorce court's equitable discretion to depart from a 50/50
split of the worth of community assets, as envisioned by Toth,
Kelly and Flower, can result in a distinct lack of horizontal equity:
similarly situated spouses may end up with different results.90 A
variety of unequal splits of community assets may occur depending
on which judge the couple draws and that judge's notion of
"fairness" within a marriage.
The problem of a lack of horizontal equity has long been
recognized as a key undesirable aspect of equitable distribution.9 1
It is particularly a problem when the division pertains to property
rights owned in undivided fashion by both spouses at the time of
division. The prospect of an unequal split of the value of
supposedly equally owned assets may undermine a spouse's ability
to rely that he or she genuinely owns those assets during a
marriage. This in turn may undermine the goal of "facilitating a
sharing relationship in an ongoing marriage" that underlies modern
community property regimes.
Open-ended administration of "equitable distribution" is
sometimes defended in spite of its sacrifice of horizontal equity on
the ground that it enables departures from the precision required in
an equal division, thereby saving costs associated with precision in
90. Toth, 946 P.2d 900 (Ariz. 1997), and Kelly, 9 P.3d 1046 (Ariz. 2000),
bury this possibility by not acknowledging it, while Flower embraces it as an
important part of the distributional scheme. Flower,225 P.3d 588, 592 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2010) ("[C]ourts might reach different conclusions in similar cases without
abusing their discretion").
91. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 LA.
L. REV. 1553, 1556 (1984) (describing equitable distribution as "more properly
called discretionary distribution" because it is more unpredictable than
equitable, and as a structure that "throws divorcing spouses .

.

. into a lottery

whose outcome greatly depends on the luck of the judicial draw and the
competence of counsel, and in which the only sure winners are the lawyers.");
Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical
Analysis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 516-519
(1966); ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at § 4.09, Reporter's Notes cmt. a;
Craig W. Dallon, The Likely Impact of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolutionon PropertyDivision, 2001 BYU L. REV. 891, 895 (2001); Ira Mark
Ellman, Inventing Family Law, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 855 (1999).
92. For identification and discussion of the sharing value, see, e.g.,
BLUMBERG, supra note 1, at 7, 28-30; Susan Westerberg Prager, Sharing
Principlesand the Future of MaritalProperty Law, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1977);
Catherine T. Smith, Marital Property: PhilosophicalModels Of MarriageAnd
Their Influence On Property Division Methods At Divorce, 11 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 214 (2000); ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at § 4.09 cmt. b.
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litigation. But this justification is not particularly compelling,
especially in community property contexts, because the community
property "equitable" jurisdictions use equal as a baseline or, in
some cases, a quite strong presumption for what is equitable. A
divorce court judge, and thus divorce lawyers, cannot appropriately
skip precise valuation of all the assets subject to division, because
precision will be necessary to effectuate the baseline of equality.
Rather than minimizing the costs of divorce litigation, leaving
wide discretion to divorce courts leaves all divorcing couples and
their lawyers in a potentially costly state of uncertainty. 94 The
uncertainty about the outcome cannot be predicted to get to
"better" settlements, as longstanding "bargaining in the shadow of
the law" literature predicts it is likely to inject bias in favor of a
spouse more willing to take risks.95
B. An open-ended use of "need" as the basisfor departuresfrom
an equal division is understandablebut undermines a key concept
of community property as owned by each spouse when generated
Should departures from a 50/50 split of the community worth
be justified on the basis that one spouse needs more? Need is a
classic underlying value associated with distribution in common

93. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 323-24. Dividing community value
equally requires meticulous characterization of each asset as either community
or separate property, and meticulous valuation of each asset not liquidated or
evenly divided in kind, thus exerting significant pressure to be perfect in
characterization and in valuation. This can get expensive, as it may involve
experts and considerable deposition testimony. "Equitable" allows much more
room to be generous in characterizing assets as community, because it permits
adjustments in the shares. Valuation similarly need not be precise, as any
equitable division is appropriate, allowing a trial court to just sort of wing it on
the value.
94. See Howard S. Erlanger, et al., Participationand Flexibility in Informal
Processes: Cautionsfrom the Divorce Context, 21 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 585, 598
(1978); Garrison, supra note 91, at 516-19. Open-ended discretion means those
who want to know how their situation would be treated in court before settling
more often need legal advice, and since legal assistance is not cheap, all other
things being equal, discretionary standards may be more expensive. While some
of these costs might be offset by legal aid/pro bono/reduced fee panels/law
school and other clinics, there is, of course, no guarantee such sources will
defray costs. If the costs of finding out are greater than what the inquirer stands
to gain by finding out, the assistance will not happen.
95. Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968-69 (1979); Marsha Garrison,
Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable Distribution
Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621 (1991).
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law "equitable" distribution jurisdictions, 96 and one community
property jurisdiction once described a form of need as the classic
reason to "equitably" depart from a 50/50 split of community
property.9 7 Despite its prevalence, however, there are many
critiques of the use of need as an underlying value justifying
equitable but unequal distributions of marital property.98
96. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at § 4.09 cmt. a and Reporter's Notes
cmt. a. But see MARTHA FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC
AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991) (arguing that even where need was
considered in property division, an equality value so strongly influenced
property distributions as to lead to equal divisions of property to the harm of
women in need); see also Milton C. Regan, Jr, Divorce Reform And The Legacy
Of Gender, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1461-1472 (1992) (reviewing FINEMAN,
supra).
97. McNabney v. McNabney, 782 P.2d 1291, 1296 (Nev. 1989) ("The
preeminent example is that of the wife and mother in a long-term marriage who

has given up career opportunities to devote herself to her family. Very
frequently justice and equity will require a divorce court to adjust community

property in an unequal manner in these cases"). The factual basis for
McNabney's idea of the "classic consideration of need" as part of an equitable
split of community property in favor of the wife is in general quite different than
it was 50 or 60 years ago. See Ira Mark Ellman, Marital Roles and Declining
Marriage Rates, 41 FAM. L.Q. 455 (2007). The classic is perhaps no longer
classic--only 20% of households feature the husband as sole earner, although
half of all working mothers don't work full-time. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 9,
at 346-47.
98. Many of the criticisms of using need to justify a particular division of
marital assets developed in response to the use of need in alimony, although
need has been an underlying basis for property division, especially in common
law equitable distribution jurisdictions, as well. See Ira Mark Ellman, The
Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989); see also ALI PRINCIPLES, supra
note 12, at § 4.09 cmt. d (the meaning and use of need does not vary whether the
context is property distribution or alimony). Criticisms range from the idea that
need-values implement a form of welfare that will perpetuate undesirable
dependency, to the idea that it undermines an equality partnership/democratic
model of marriage, one best facilitated by an equal rather than need-based
division of assets and liabilities should the joint venture dissolve. See Ellman,
supra; Smith, supra note 92. The ALI Principles conclude that need is not
relevant to property division because need neither explains who should meet the
need nor justifies making the other spouse meet it. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note
12, at § 4.09 cmt. d, § 5.02 cmt. a. Instead, the ALI Principles suggest
compensation for loss as the proper theory for alimony, and propose imposing it
occasionally on property distribution, too, as a reason to depart from a 50-50
split. Id. Under this approach, a spouse might receive compensation from the
other spouse for loss of earning capacity arising from a spouse's
disproportionate share of caretaking for children, losses that arise from the
changes in life opportunities caused by adjustments a spouse make during a long
marriage, disparities in the financial impact of a short marital relationship on the
spouses' post-divorce lives, as compared to their situation prior to marriage, and
the primacy of the income earner's claim to benefit from the fruits of his or her
own labor, as compared to the claims of a former spouse. Id.
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I do not propose in this essay to resolve once and for all
whether need is an appropriate factor for shifting assets between
spouses at divorce, or whether compensation is a better theoretical
concept for addressing the needs of divorced mothers.99 My point
is limited: use of need or compensation to justify departures from a
50/50 split of community worth at divorce, undertaken as part of a
vague, standardless inquiry concerning an "equitable division,"
undermines important community groperty concepts of genuine
In addition, divorce courts
property ownership and equality.'
departures from a 50/50
"equitable"
given the authority to make
restricted by the word
be
not
are
split of the community worth
of
divorced mothers as a
needs
the
only
to
considering
"equitable"
0'
departures.'
basis for
Decisions about whether need or compensation for loss are
appropriate justifications for distributional awards to one spouse
can best be handled in a spousal support structure. Spousal support
structures already permit consideration of need as a basis for the
support and can standardize and specify the nature of the inquiry

99. The ALI Principles approach of substituting loss for need offers more
precision and can be expected to make results more uniform. Any departure
from a 50/50 division of the net worth of community property, even on the basis
of loss, would nevertheless undermine the idea of presently owned community
property. The ALI Principles justify including loss as a factor in property
division as well as alimony because that approach, using need, "is implicit in
existing law," ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at § 409 cmt. d, and because as a
practical matter, property division and period payments are two ways to get to
the same place. The comments, which stress practicality, can be read to simply
suggest that a trial judge should not be precluded from using a lump sum current
asset award rather than periodic payments in fashioning a remedy for the ALI
Principles' proposed loss-compensation based alimony. Id. at § 409, Reporter's
Notes cmt. d. Viewed this way, the comments do not advocate large departures
from a 50/50 split of the community worth on the basis of loss factors.
100. Although in a different context, Chief Justice Roger Traynor of the
California Supreme Court recognized the true nature of community property as
genuine existing ownership, not a contingency based on the situation a judge
may conclude exists at the end of the marriage. See v. See, 415 P.2d 776, 78283 (Cal. 1966) (community property is a 'present, existing and equal interest"'
not to be transformed by a legal rule into "an inchoate expectancy" only
possibly available in some amount or form at the end of the marriage).
101. The historic use of need based factors in distribution has often resulted
in a departure from a 50/50 split in favor of women who have fewer financial
prospects at divorce than the husband, but Arizona's "equitable" distribution
structure does not appear to be emphasizing such a result. Toth, 946 P.2d 900
(Ariz. 1997), Kelly, 9 P.3d 1046 (Ariz. 2000), and Flower, 225 P.3d 588 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2010), each adjust the 50/50 split in favor of the husband, without
appearing to consider the needs of the wife. Toth and Flower, however, may
signal an emphasis on the needs of spouses over 80.
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into need and the basis for an award. 102 Practical aspects of
whether need is better addressed via lump sum methods rather than
periodic payments can be better accommodated within this
alimony structure, in which couples are permitted, once need
obligations are established, to agree to a property distribution that
eliminates or minimizes the need for periodic payments. 0 3
Arizona's divorce distribution system of "equitably, not
necessarily in kind" already accommodates a key aspect of need
without departing from a 50/50 split of the community property. A
drawback to an equal system is that the only practical way to
achieve an equal distribution of each asset is to liquidate the assets
and divide the money. Liquidation may be undesirable from the
perspective of minor children of the divorcing couple if, for
example, the marital home is liquidated.104 This is a form of need,
although it is child-based need more than spousal need. Arizona's
equitable system enables considerations of need concerning the
direction of particular assets, thereby facilitating a distribution in
which the marital home can more easily go to the custodial parent
(although in some situations there may not be enough remaining
community assets to balance the distribution). 0 5 Use of a broad
"equitable" distribution scheme to give the family home outright to
the custodial spouse, without finding some method of splitting the
community worth 50/50, may further skew the already-pressurefilled incentives spouses face to seek custody as part of an overall
divorce settlement strategy rather than out of a true desire for
custody.
C An open-ended idea of "contribution"to justify a largershare
for the spouse who generatedcommunity assets is a frontal assault
on the concept of community property.
A driving motivation for the result in Toth, Kelly, and Flowers
is the extent of the respective spouses' contributions to the
102. See BLUMBERG, supra note 1, at 24. This is the currently existing
approach in California. As a practical matter, only a small number of divorces
feature divisible assets sufficient to avoid an alimony determination. Therefore
for most divorcing couples the alimony structure cannot be avoided by an
unequal property division. ALI PRINCIPLES, supranote 12, Introductionat 26.
103. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 337.
104. California recognized this problem and amended its statute providing
for an exception to the equal division requirement. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2601
(West 2010).
105. One solution is to defer any sale of the residence, and, as the ALI
Principlespropose, provide a child support credit for the non-custodial spouse.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at § 4.09(3) and § 4.09 cmt. i.
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community. The spouses that contributed the assets in question
were rewarded with a greater share of the community worth, and
the spouses that may not have made contributions to the assets or
the community as a whole received less than 50% of the
community worth. While need/contribution-for-loss based
"equitable distribution" considerations seem like a wolf in sheep's
clothin*, contribution values seem like a wolf that comes as a
wolf.'0 Contribution values contain an inherent bias against a
spouse who provides only non-pecuniary contributions to the
community, because the underlying implication of contribution as
a basis for a departure from a 50/50 split of the community assets
is that a spouse who failed to contribute much toward an asset or
toward the marriae in general need not receive 50% of the
community worth.' This idea threatens the fundamental premise
of the modem view of community property' 08 and is a step back in
the direction of the common law title system. 0 9 Community
property systems are not vehicles that enable each of the spouses to
get paid with community assets for their contributions to the
community, with each entitled to equal pay only if they made equal
contributions. Rather, the message to each spouse delivered by a
community property system is that regardless of what is done by
each spouse and how it is done, each spouse will own equally all of
the assets generated or deliberately placed into the marital
community by either spouse. In addition, each spouse will be
equally responsible for all the debts incurred by either spouse on
behalf of the marital community. A goal of a community property
system is to facilitate long-lasting marriages by freeing each
spouse to contribute (or not) in a variety of ways, especially nonpecuniary ways, without worrying about the need to contribute in
pecuniary ways or in ways that can be proven to facilitate greater
106. I first saw the analogy of legal rules that come disguised or directly as a
wolf in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 700 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at § 4.09 cmt. b. If serious weight is

given to contribution for purposes of departing from a 50/50 split, the almost

tautological result will be unequal distributions in the direction of the spouse
with greater economic ability, as it tends to favor the wage earner. As the ALI
Principles point out, using contribution as part of an equitable calculus thus
conflicts with need-based values. Id. at cmt. a.
108. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 341 (making this point by slightly
misstating: "Note that contribution is not relevant under the community property
system."); see also ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at § 4.09 cmt. c ("Unequal
financial contribution is rarely accepted as a basis for unequal division among
the community-property states"). The ALI Principles reject any idea of an
unequal-contribution exception to an equal division. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note
12, at § 4.09 cmt. c.
109. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at § 4.09 cmt. b.
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financial earnings for the community as a whole.o10 Contribution,
like need, should play an appropriate role in the decision
concerning where a particular asset goes in the event of divorce.
Contemplating that the contributor is entitled to a greater-than50%-share because he is the contributor is to suggest that equal
ownership of community property is a myth.
D. A Combination of Contributionand Need: UnequalDistribution
of Community Debts?
Even if community assets should be divided equally, without
consideration of need or contribution, should debts be distributed
equitably rather than equally? Marital debt incurred on the basis of
the income-earning capacity of both spouses, split equally, may
pose problems for a spouse with lower post-divorce income
prospects."' To address this area of need, the prototypical "equal"
division community property jurisdiction, California, enables a
"just and equitable" assignment of community debt, although only
exceed community
in the event that community liabilities
112
property/quasi-community property assets.
Unfortunately, unequal debt allocation based either on need or
contribution potentially undermines another important aspect of
management
and
property
systems-equal
community
control-which empowers each spouse to make financial decisions
based on the entire wealth and earning power of the marital
community, without requiring a joint decision.1 13 Equal
management and control goes hand in hand with equal present
ownership, and an underlying goal of the rules mandating equal
110. See Prager,supra note 92.
111. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at § 409 cmt. h (If one spouse earns more
than the other during marriage, when the couple incurs debt, "the spouses (as well
as their creditor) normally rely disproportionately on the income of the higher
earner to service it. Where the debt has not been repaid at the time of divorce, and
exceeds the marital assets, the parties' disparate earnings remain the only source
for retiring it, and are appropriately considered in its allocation.").
112. CAL. FAM. CODE. § 2622 (b) (West 2010). The ALI Principles propose
much the same idea. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at § 409 (2)(c) (When "debts
exceed assets ... an equal allocation of the debt may be unjust ... because of a
significant disparity between the spouses in their financial capacity, their
participation in the decision to incur the debt, their consumption of the goods or
services that the debt was incurred to acquired, or some combination.

. .

. [In such

situations] it is just and equitable to assign the excess debt unequally."). Marsha
Garrison proposed the same thing 20 years ago for New York, suggesting the
comparison of spousal incomes and expenses in a division. Garrison, supra note 95.
113. All community property states maintain a version of equal management
and control. REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 1, at 257-58.
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management and control, like the rules mandating equal
ownership, is facilitation of a long-lasting marital relationship.114
An unequal debt allocation based on concepts of justice and equity,
rather than part of a 50/50 split of the overall worth of the
community, implicitly places liability on a spouse for making a
decision to incur community liability that did not work out
positively." 5 The approach thus discounts the fact that liability was
incurred pursuing potential or actual benefits to the community and
emphasizes the liability solely as a negative to be paid off. The
divorce court evaluation of whether to unequally allocate the
community debts at divorce may unavoidably involve secondguessing how community assets were managed and consumed."16
The prospect of this second-guessing may in turn influence and
thereby undermine a spouse's management and control behaviors
within a marriage."1 7
Permitting a divorce court to assess the financial and nonfinancial benefits of a debt, including who benefitted in which
way, for purposes of placing greater responsibility on one spouse
for various debts, is unwise. It poses the same trap as divorce court
assessments concerning particular contributions to a particular
asset, and comparisons to overall need, for purposes of dividing
community assets unequally. For both inquiries, it would not be
unusual for motivation, consumption, and need to pull in different
directions, leaving decisions standardless. If community assets are
negative, it seldom will be one easy-to-characterize financial
decision that led to the result. It is naive to think otherwise." 8
In addition, authorizing divorce courts to allocate marital debts
unequally raises complications pertaining to the creditors.
Creditors, ordinarily not parties to the divorce proceedings,' 19 do
114. See Susan Prager, The Persistence Of Separate Property Concepts In
California'sCommunity PropertySystem, 1849-1975, 24 UCLA L. REv. 1, 68-72.
115. Departing from a 50/50 split only when debts outweigh liabilities may
subtly punish managers whose investment turns out so poorly that, combined
with other decisions, the community is left in the red, even if uncontrollable
market effects ultimately were responsible for rendering the community with
less assets than liabilities.
116. Some liabilities may be incurred even though there is no expectation of
a positive return, for example.
117. Such second-guessing is widely perceived as undesirable. See ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at § 4.10 cmt. b.
118. An example in the ALI Principles concedes as much, suggesting that
after full consideration of these factors a divorce court "may or may not" divide
the debt equally and "may or may not" divide the debt according to post-divorce
predicted incomes. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at § 4.09 illus. 2.
119. James Ratner, Creditor and Debtor Windfalls at Divorce, 3 EST. PLAN.
& COMMUNITY PROP. L. J. 211 (2011).
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not want their ability to collect jeopardized by a divorce allocation
of assets and liabilitiesl 20 and are consequently not usually
precluded from collecting from either spouse subsequent to the
divorce. 121 As long as community creditors are permitted to seek
satisfaction from either spouse after a divorce, a departure from a
50/50 overall split of the worth of the community, including debts,
will not offer strong protection to the spouse assigned less of the
debt, regardless of the reason for the unequal distribution.122
California has adjusted away from the usual approach of enabling a
creditor to obtain satisfaction of community debts from either
spouse after divorce by precluding creditors from seeking assets
from a non-debtor spouse not assigned the debt at divorce. The
preclusion offers some protection to a non-debtor spouse but offers
non-debtor spouses a possible windfall from divorcel24 and creates
incentives for couples to divorce.1 25
A regime that permits an unequal division of community
liabilities and requires a creditor to collect from only the spouse
assigned the liability at divorce provides some protection for a
spouse with less potential to earn after a divorce. The combination
of an unequal division of the liabilities combined with creditor
inability to follow and collect from all community assets after
divorce, however, not only sets up windfalls for the spouse given
the lesser amount of debt and incentives for spouses to divorce to
minimize their total liability. It also has the potential to turn every
120. Id.
121. Id. The usual rule is that if the spouse not assigned the debt ends up
having to pay the creditor, that person is entitled to reimbursement from the
spouse assigned the debt, in effect turning the spouse that pays into an
involuntary creditor of the spouse assigned the debt who did not pay it.
122. Id. In particular, many spouses who incur debt and consume the benefits
of it during a marriage will continue to incur debt and not pay it back after the
marriage is over, in effect continuing to impose a disproportionate allocation on
the other spouse.
123. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2622(b) (West 2010); see also Ratner, supra note
119. The protection will not work, however, if the spouse with less ability to pay
is the debtor spouse. No jurisdiction contemplates precluding the creditor from
seeking satisfaction from the actual debtor spouse. Ratner, supra note 119.
124. Ratner, supra note 119.
125. Andrea Carroll, Incentivizing Divorce, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1925, 19281944 (2009). In the extreme, a couple could try to divorce, assign as many debts as
possible to one spouse and all of the assets to the other spouse, and in that way
avoid collection while continuing their relationship. Id. At the same time, for all
community debts assigned in whole or in part to the non-debtor spouse,
California's structure gives possible windfalls to creditors, because if a non-debtor
spouse is assigned the debt at divorce, all of her assets, including separate property
assets unavailable to a community creditor during a marriage, are available. See
CAL. FAM. CODE §2622(b) (West 2004); Ratner, supra note 119.
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routine divorce into a mini-bankruptcy hearing in which creditors
may insist on playing a crucial role in allocation of debts and
assets. Under such a regime, every routine decision concerning
allocation of community liabilities and assets has the potential to
affect all community creditors' ability to collect.126
Marital debt raises perplexing issues. The way to address those
issues is not, however, to dump all matters of who initiated, who
benefitted from, and who has the better ability to pay various debts
in both a relative and an absolute sense into a vague, standardless
equitable distribution structure. Perhaps the most sensible way 27
to accommodate need or loss concerns associated with marital debt
is via a spousal support structure. Property allocation adjustments
should be reserved for situations of genuine financial misconduct
that leads to the debt. Each community property jurisdiction,
regardless of whether its norm is equitable or equal distribution,
already permits property division adjustments when there has been
genuine financial misconduct.128 The adjustments do not ordinarily
necessitate a departure from a 50/50 split of the worth because the
mismanaging spouse's share of the community worth often can
simply include the losses imposed by the mismanagement.129
E. Open-ended considerationof "contributionto the marital
relationship" and "goodfaith efforts" as part of an equitable
division of the worth of the community inevitably involvesfaultbased considerations.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the open-ended idea of
"equitable distribution" espoused by Toth, Kelly and Flower is that
it inevitably injects a vague concept of fault into the calculus for
126. Ratner, supra note 119, at 237.
127. A possible alternative that responds to the real problem is to rethink the
characterization of a debt as entirely a marital debt if it was incurred based only on
the assets and earning power of one of the spouses, including separate assets.
Pushed to an analytical extreme, it might make sense to contemplate that if an
unpaid liability was incurred based on post-divorce earnings of a spouse, that
obligation could be characterized in whole or in part as the separate property of
that spouse. Ratner, supra note 119. But this approach requires that assets
traceable to that liability would need to be characterized as separate provertv. too.
128. Arizona's statute is typical. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §25-318 (West,
Westlaw through 2011) enables a divorce court to consider abnormal
expenditures, destruction, concealment or fraudulent disposition when dividing
the community assets and liabilities. California allows for other than an equal
split if one spouse "deliberately misappropriated [community property] to the
exclusion of the interest of the other party in the community estate." CAL. FAM.
CODE § 2602 (West 2004).
129. ALI PRNCIPLES, supra note 12, at § 4.11, Reporter's Notes at 769.
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dividing the worth of the community.130 The standard no-fault
regime in most community property states precludes a lawyer from
arguing that marital misconduct is a basis for departing from a
50/50 split.' 3 ' Nevertheless, the Toth-Kelly-Flower approach to
"equitable" considerations allows fault to come in a side door in
unspecified ways. Toth, in particular, concludes that a divorce
court has discretion to consider when a spouse moved out of the
marital bedroom and whether a spouse made a good faith effort to
contribute to the marital relationship.' 32 The conclusion invites any
divorcing party to introduce evidence concerning the who, what,
when, and why concerning how the relationship deteriorated.13
Facts pertaining to subtle forms of fault and lack of contribution,
along with vague facts concerning need and strong facts
concerning who generated the asset, are likely to be present in
virtually every divorce. Thus, all divorce discovery and every
divorce settlement conference are infected by the prospect that one
side or the other may raise the possibility of fault and seek a
departure from a 50/50 split.
There is real danger in permitting a divorce court to assess,
under an open-ended, unrestricted notion of an "equitable" division
of the community worth, whether a spouse adequately contributed
to the marital community. The permission places power in the
130. See Toth v. Toth, 946 P.2d 900, 906 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc) (Moeller, J.,
dissenting) ("Any reasonable reading of these findings compels the conclusion
that the trial judge made the unequal division because of some perceived fault
on Mrs. Toth's part ... .)
131. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §25-318 (West, Westlaw through
2011) (division of property shall be made "without regard to marital
misconduct"); ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, Reporter's Notes at 67-84.
Arizona, California, Louisiana, Idaho, New Mexico, Nevada, and Washington
have a no-fault regime for property division purposes. Id. Texas appears to
permit consideration of fault in a property division, perhaps as long as it is not
"punishment." See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001 (marital property is to be
divided as the divorce court "deems just and right."); Smith v. Smith 143
S.W.3d 206, 213 (Tex. App. 2004) (fault acceptable as a basis for division); see
also Lauren Redman, Domesticity and the Texas Community Property System,
16 BuF. WOM. LAW J. 23, 27-28 (2008). The ALI Principles concluded that
more than half of all states do not permit consideration of fault for purposes of
property division. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, Reporter's Notes at 67-84
(2002).
132. See supra Part I.A.
133. The husband in Flower v. Flower, 225 P.3d 588 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010),
for example, responded to the Toth v. Toth, 946 P.2d 900 (1997), invitation by
arguing his wife did not make a good faith effort in the marriage, and instead
only married him for his money, an argument that did not succeed in annulment
but was in some way considered by the trial court as part of an equitable
calculation that gave the husband considerably more than half the community
property. See supra PartI.C.
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judiciary to make unreviewable decisions concerning what
behaviors are "normal" and what behaviors are not normal, in
marital and marital-type relationships. The inevitable temptation of
divorce court judges, when given an open-ended instruction to do
what is fair and equitable, is to include as part of their basis for
their decisions their conclusions concerning who was at fault, or
more at fault, with respect to the assets and the relationship
between the parties. A rule requiring an equitable distribution of
marital property will never escape an undercurrent of fault, which
may be one reason why equitable distribution has so often been
vilified for being unpredictable and thereby sacrificing horizontal
equity.134 Fault-based inquiries are both intrusive to the parties and
suspect because they are influenced by the factual interpretations
and life experiences of the judge making the inquiry. A divorce
court judge's generalizations about whether behavior is aberrant or
faulty and therefore not a contribution might well be considered
wrong by one of the parties or a different divorce court judge.
Because an open-ended notion of "equitable" has no absolute
reference point, and instead will vary from decision-maker to
decision-maker, it is standardless and thus cannot afford
meaningful review. Toth, Kelly and Flower demonstrate that
judges, given the power to make an equitable distribution, do not
want to give up that power in favor of an inquiry that will not
include fault-style factors, and will instead opt for a virtually
unreviewable interpretation of "equitable" that enables
consideration of whatever the judge thinks is fair.' 35 Fault is thus
insidious in an equitable distribution context, lurking just beneath
the surface, justif ng intrusive inquiry without offering benefits in
property division.

134. See supra Part II.A.
135. See, e.g., Toth, 946 P.2d at 903 ("[T]he statute .... does not purport to
define the universe of relevance. 'Equitable' means just that-it is a concept of
fairness dependent upon the facts of particular cases.").
136. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 42-67 (noting that until 1968,
fault was an allowed factor in property distribution decisions, that now
"American law is sharply divided on the question of whether 'marital
misconduct' should be considered in allocating marital property," and
concluding that fault should be left out of marital property distributions, because
the possible valid purposes for considering fault are best served by tort and
criminal law regimes and fault has the potential to impose "serious distortions in
the dissolution action").

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

48

III.

[Vol. 72

THE PROBLEM OF MAKING RULES ON PERVERSE CASES

Making rules on the perverse case is a problem for all areas of
law,137 and a particular problem in marital property law, in which a
large number of decisions are made 38 and only a tiny fraction are
appealed. Appeals seem to occur only when there is a combination
of a large amount of money at stake, facts so uncommon that none
of the normal structures seem to fit, and relative irrationality of at
least one of the parties. The development of marital property case
law and statutory interpretation thus generally occurs in response
to cases that depart meaningfully from the factual norm for
divorcing couples. The interpretations and rules, however,
fashioned in response to highly stylized facts, are then picked up
and used as "the law." 1 39
Toth and Kelly involved highly stylized facts' 40 that
necessitated an interpretation of "equitable" in the divorce
137. This point underlies the saying "hard cases make bad law." That phrase
is attributed to English Judge Robert Rolf in Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng.
Rep. 402, 405-06 (1842) ("This is one of those unfortunate cases in which ... it
is, no doubt, a hardship upon the plaintiff to be without a remedy, but by that
consideration we ought not to be influenced. Hard cases, it has frequently been
observed, are apt to introduce bad law."). The decision, hardly foresighted,
denied the plaintiff a negligence claim because there was no privity of contract,
thus leaving severely restricted claims of negligence in 19th century England.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, dissenting in an early antitrust case, Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), did not offer a reference to
any source when he wrote that "great cases, like hard cases, make bad law."
138. For example, all divorces in Arizona, even if uncontested or the product
of settlement, involve a judicial decree concerning distribution of property.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (4) (West, Westlaw through 2011). The total
number of Arizona divorces in the year 2005 was reported to be 24,535.
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, NATIONAL VITAL
STATISTICS REPORTS, BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, DIVORCES AND DEATHS:
PROVISIONAL DATA FOR 2005, tbl.3. Westlaw searches did not reveal a reported
or unreported appeal decision that cited the Arizona divorce distribution statute
in 2005 or otherwise appealed a property distribution.
139. A good example is Hrudka v. Hrudka, 919 P.2d 179, 183, 185-88 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1995). The case involved a debt of more than $3.5 million, gifts of
jewelry worth over $1 million, a Valentine's day 1987 Rolls Royce with a big
bow, plus a prenuptial agreement presented to the wife two days before
marriage-with the statements that without it there would be no marriage-but
that probably wouldn't ever be enforced, with the parties swapping positions on
the enforceability of the agreement in the middle of trial, and a motion by the
wife to disqualify the husband's lawyer. Nothing was remotely normal about the
case, yet Westlaw citing references list 100 references to the case.
140. The facts of Flower v. Flower, 225 P.3d 588 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010), in
contrast, are not particularly unusual. Flower is an example of a case that
employs decision-tools developed to address perverse facts in order to resolve
normal facts.
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distribution statute. While the unusual facts of these cases may
have led the judges to seek statutory flexibility to "do what is
just,"' 4 ' the consequence of the interpretation is to impose a highly
discretionary, virtually standardless regime on all divorces. Most
divorces will not be improved by injecting into the divorce process
the possibility of an unequal split of the community worth assessed
by a standardless evaluation of the duration of the marriage, each
spouse's age, health and need, each spouse's contribution to
community assets, the nature of each spouse's "contribution to the
marriage relationship," and whether each spouse made a good faith
effort to contribute to the relationship. Even worse, such a regime
inevitably invites an inquiry into behavior that looks suspiciously
like marital misconduct, and creates an opportunity for divorce
lawyers in no-fault regimes to nevertheless develop fault issues
and use them to seek a more favorable property division. The
injection of uncertainty concerning need and asset contribution,
along with the inclusion of the peculiar sort of fault calculus, raise
the specter of an increased number of divorce cases that will
feature arguments in court in favor of a significant departure from
a 50/50 split. The open-ended interpretation of "equitable" in Toth
and Kelly will likely influence settlement negotiations,1 42
discovery, and eventually could influence how pro se couples
reach their own decisions. 43
The matter of equitable rather than equal comes down to
whether an open-ended, standardless notion of "equitable
distribution" is necessary to permit something other than 50/50
distribution in the occasional situation where "everybody knows" a
50/50 split will yield a bad result. The judiciary and perhaps the
general public often seem to cling to judicial discretion as an
essential attribute of the judicial system, in the hope that a wise
judge with Solomonic wisdom will get it right. Overly rigid rules
can create undesirable results that leave everyone with a lack of
respect for the judiciary and the rule of law. Courts and legislators
141. Toth v. Toth, 946 P.2d 900, 903 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc) ("This unusual
case is one of those 'rare occasions when the circumstances and facts are such
that, in all fairness to the parties' . ... equal is not equitable.")

142. Property division at divorce is a classic example of bargaining in the
shadow of the law. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at § 4.09, Reporter's Notes
cmt. a. (citing Robert Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow
of the Law: The Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979)).
143. Although the legal rule may not affect pro se divorce, as the parties may
be unaware of the rule, a "common understanding" of the rule may develop
given the amount of discussion concerning divorce distribution that can be
found on, e.g., the Internet. (A Google search on "Arizona divorce distribution
rules" yielded "about 91,700 results (0.21 seconds).")
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appear to endorse judicial discretion.14" Washington describes its
equitable distribution system as "a wise legislative recognition of
the fact that the establishment of hard and fast rules in this area
would only lead to inequities and untenable results." 4 5
Concerning marital property issues, however, the cost of this
flexibility is substantial. A do-the-right-thing interpretation of
equitable, motivated by the need to respond to perverse facts,
cannot be contained, despite statements in a decision to depart
from a 50/50 split that it is unusual to do SO.1 46 Containment is not
possible because there is no consensus concerning which facts
should be included in the evaluation of when a situation is so
unusual as to necessitate the departure. Many people believe need
to be a sufficient justification for a departure from a 50/50 split,
but there is little agreement concerning when that need is so
extensive as to justify a greater share for the needy spouse.147
Other people believe that there is not a sufficient basis for divorce
courts to undertake a consideration of need, and argue awards
based on need should be replaced by reimbursement for financial
loss.1 4 8 Many people reject contribution as a basis for a divorce
court's award of assets to a spouse,149 yet the main feature leading
to the result in Toth and Flower was that key assets were
contributed by one spouse, and the other spouse's contributions to
the asset or the marital relationship in general were deemed
inadequate to justify a 50/50 split.'5 There is thus no consensus
144. Dallon, supra note 91, at 909 (2001).
145. In re Marriage of Kittleson, 585 P.2d 167, 172 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
146. Toth v. Toth, 946 P.2d 900 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc), Kelly v. Kelly, 9 P.3d
1046 (Ariz. 2000), and Flower v. Flower, 225 P.3d 588 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010),
dutifully make such pronouncements. See Toth, 946 P.2d at 903 ("This is not a
departure from the general principle that all marital joint property should be
divided substantially equally unless sound reason exists to divide the property
otherwise."); Flower, 225 P.3d at 596 ("We conclude by emphasizing that in our
view, a substantially unequal division of property must continue to represent a
rare exception, lest it undermine the entire framework for dividing property
during a marriage dissolution. . . ."). But, these brief statements are swamped by
the quantity of discussion concerning the result and that trial court discretion
that will not be overruled without clear error. See Toth, 946 P.2d at 903-04;
Flower, 225 P.3d at 592-596. Perhaps part of the blame for this belongs with
legal education, as lawyers tend to emphasize rules rather than distinguishing
facts.
147. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at § 4.09 cmt. d.
148. Id.
149. Id. at § 4.09 cmt. c ("Unequal financial contribution is rarely accepted
as a basis for unequal division among the community-property states, nor does
the trend favor it in the common-law states.").
150. See Toth, 946 P.2d at 903 ("Anthony paid for this property entirely ....
Gloria made no contribution-pecuniary or otherwise-to the purchase of the

2011]

EQUITABLE IS NOT EQUAL

51

concerning which factors are appropriate for considering a
departure from the 50/50 norm and, thus, no basis for excluding
inquiry concerning any of them.
Whenever a rule is developed in response to a blend of unusual
facts, the likely result will be that there will be no consensus
concerning when other facts are sufficiently unusual as to obtain
the same treatment. There is, in fact, no consensus, and therefore
no standard, concerning the point at which the blend of various
factors tips in favor of departing from the 50/50 norm. Some
people suggest that if one spouse has higher earning ca acity and
income and does the majority of the household work, 5 or if a
wife makes more money than her husband, does most of the
housework, provides care for the children, and the husband leaves
home, spends nights out drinking, and is violent, 5 2 it is not
sensible to order an equal division of marital property. If a husband
provided for all his wife's needs and education and she
accumulated her own earnings, is it fair and equitable to give the
husband a larger share of the marital assets?' 5 3 Is a departure
justified every time a marriage was short, as it was in Toth, or
every time a federal rule interferes with the state scheme, as it did
in Kelly?' 54 In Flower, the marriage was not very long, the wife
had her own house, and the husband believed she was only

house. The marriage lasted two weeks, allowing no time for a marital
relationship to develop, or for other equities to come into play."); Flower, 225
P.3d at 594 ("A determination of what constitutes an equitable division of
marital property must include consideration of contributions made by each
spouse to the community, in whatever form. . . . Wife does not assert that she
made any contributions to the purchase or improvement of the . . . house nor

does she allege she made pecuniary contributions to the community in other
areas or that any effort, toil, or contributions from the community were
comingled with the property to increase its value. . . . Wife's lack of

contributions provides at least partial justification for a substantially unequal
division of the community property. . . .").
151. Dallon, supra note 91, at 911-912 (citing Matwijczuk v. Matwijczuk,
690 N.Y.S.2d 343, 344-45 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999), Jochum v. Jochum, 557
N.W.2d 257 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996), and Mosley v. Mosley, 601 A.2d 599 (D.C.
1992)).
152. Id. at 912 (citing Mosley v. Mosley, 601 A.2d 599 (D.C. 1992)).
153. Id. at 912-913 (citing In re Marriage of Stetler, 657 N.E.2d 395 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1995)).
154. Kelly v. Kelly, 9 P.3d 1046, 1048 (Ariz. 2000) ("The resulting
benefits, but for federal law, would be divisible as community property . . .. It

may be suggested that this method will create an imbalance whenever there is
a disparity between the salaries of each spouse. But such an inequity is not of
our making ..... ").
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financially (and not romantically) interested in him.' 5 5 The trial
and appellate judges thought those facts sufficiently unusual to
depart from the norm. In Hatch, 5 6 a trial court found the husband
had made a much greater relative effort to preserve and protect the
community estate, and the wife had deliberately destroyed a
meaningful father-daughter relationship, justifying a $170,000/
$27,000 split in favor of the husband. 5 7
The open-ended idea of an "equitable" distribution of the
community property, developed to address unusual facts that
struck some judges as unfair, provides no standard for resolving
any of these situations. Instead, it empowers judges to impose their
individual differing senses of what is appropriate in a marriage on
the rest of the world. Results will be random, depending on the
belief system and life experiences of the divorce court judge that
decides. There is thus as much to be feared as to be embraced by
such empowerment, depending on whether one is inside or outside
of a randomly assigned decision-maker's norm concerning
personal and idiosyncratic marital behaviors.
The other problem with making rules on perverse cases is
straightforward: the rules influence the entire landscape, not just
the individuals with the perverse facts. The open-ended
interpretation of equitable distribution developed in Toth, Kelly
and Flower is applicable to every divorce and thus injects
uncertainty and fault into the calculus for every single divorce. The
uncertainty concerning whether the facts of the situation justify a
departure from a 50/50 split undermines yet another desirable
attribute of the community property system: community worth,
split 50/50, is the great compromise solution that ensures that
neither side is entirely closed out. A clear signal concerning a
50/50 split of the community worth is a stride in the direction of
helping couples come to their own settlements, either at divorce or
prior to marriage. Subjecting all divorce litigation and settlement to
the possibility of an open-ended idea of equitable distribution in
which divorce court and appellate judges are permitted to exercise
their inevitable biases concerning who should get more and why
undermines that attribute.
The flexibility to depart from a 50/50 division in a small
number of perverse situations is thus not worth the cost. No serious
155. Flower, 225 P.3d at 590.
156. Hatch v. Hatch, 547 P.2d 1044, 1046-47 (Ariz. 1976) (en banc).
157. Id. at 1046-47. The Arizona Supreme Court overruled the trial court,
indicating that the basis for departure was not sound and hinting that it might be
inconsistent with due process in the United States Constitution to divide the
community property unequally. Id. at 1045-47.
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damage would have been done in Toth, Kelly, and Flower if those
decisions had stuck with a rule that the community worth must be
split roughly 50/50, with plenty of discretion concerning the
direction of the assets. If judicial decision-makers genuinely
believe results are unjust, they should confront the specific rules
that lead to the perceived problem,15 8 rather than adopt a structure
that can give a tailored result in the case at hand but that has the
potential to make every divorce far more excruciating.
IV. CONCLUSION

Community property regimes entitle spouses to undivided
present ownership of community assets during a marriage. At
divorce, however, most community property jurisdictions parrot
common law jurisdictions and divide the community property
equitably rather than equally. While "equitable" could be
interpreted to differ from "equal" only in that "equal" requires a
50/50 split of each community asset and "equitable" requires only
equal division of the community worth, "equitable" has recently
been interpreted in a far more open-ended manner. As a result,
vague factors including need, contribution, duration of the
marriage, the age of the divorcing parties, and the behavior of the
parties during the marriage are used to justify substantially unequal
divisions of community property at divorce.
Arizona is a representative example of a community property
jurisdiction that has moved to an open-ended interpretation of
"equitably" that in the discretion of divorce court judges can be
used to implement notably unequal divisions of community
property. In Toth, a divorce court was permitted to consider
contribution and a lack of evidence that during the first weeks of
the marriage the wife made a good faith effort to make a marriage
work as justification for an approximately 90/10 split of the
community property in favor of the husband. In Kelly, a divorce
158. Thus, for Toth v Toth, 946 P.2d 900 (1997), it is perhaps worth
considering whether to treat separate property placed in JTWRS title as a gift
that is only fully effective if the donor spouse dies while still married, making it
is a gift of present use during the marriage and outright ownership at death-but
not an outright gift effectuated at divorce. If the marriage ends in divorce, the
gift is traceable to separate property and should be treated that way despite the
title. See Ratner, supra note 26. For Kelly, the preemption analysis should be
directly confronted, and perhaps an opportunity cost reimbursement scheme
should be adopted. For Flower, the husband can be given his house outright,
especially considering that his wife has a house, but the community worth needs
to be equalized, perhaps by assigning more community debt to the husband as an
offset.
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court was entitled to consider the lack of contribution of the wife to
the community retirement plans compared to the husband's
contribution to the community retirement plan as justification for
giving the husband a greater share of his retirement plan. In
Flower, a divorce court was permitted to consider the contribution
of the husband to the community assets, the lack of contribution of
the wife to the community assets, the duration of the marriage, and
the overall "fairness" of the situation as justification for giving the
husband a significantly larger share of the community worth.
The adoption of a broad, standardless interpretation of the
statutory instruction to equitably divide the community property,
exemplified by the Arizona cases, is a bad idea. The matter an
equitable rather than equal division comes down to whether the
flexibility of an open-ended, standardless notion of equitable
division of the community worth is necessary to permit something
other than a 50/50 distribution in the occasional situation where
everybody knows a 50/50 split yields a bad result. The need to
address the unusual situations posed in the facts of those cases
likely led to the open-ended concept of equitable division
articulated in the Arizona cases, but that interpretation cannot be
constrained to the highly stylized facts that led to the
interpretation. Instead, the interpretation injects into every divorce
the potential for a fight over the need to depart from a 50/50 split
of the community worth. In addition, because the open-ended
conception of "equitable" adopted by the Arizona cases includes
authorizing divorce courts to consider whether spouses contributed
to the marriage relationship, the use of "equitable" as envisioned
by those decisions injects a form of fault inquiry into the calculus
concerning the proper share of the community worth. The costs of
the flexibility to adjust in a small number of situations seem far
outweighed by the harms of distortion to the vast majority of
divorces.
Equal division in the end is perhaps best justified by the fact
that the alternatives are much worse. 159 Division of marital
property at divorce is largely implemented in default or pro se
contexts and is often mostly about the debt. The open-ended
interpretation of "equitable" suggested by Toth, Kelly, and Flower
and employed by many common law equitable distribution
jurisdictions promotes the hassle of divorce, the expense of
divorce, and the power of the judiciary to impose various judges'
ideas of a "fair" split. Equal, rather than equitable, offers a
superior, although imperfect, compromise between the competing
159.
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claims of contribution and needl 60 as well as the legitimate societal
desire to enable judicial flexibility. The combination of needs and
contributions that is sufficient to justify departures from a 50/50
split is prohibitively difficult to define. When left to a trial judge's
virtually unreviewable sense of fairness, the result is a standardless
system that cannot predictably accomplish any of the conflicting
distributional goals suggested by the values underlying the system.
The lack of predictability undermines the community property
attribute that what is being divided already has property rights
attached to it. Community property systems are propert
ownership systems rather than just divorce distribution systems.
Property ownership determinations based on vague and conflicting
notions of equity and fairness will undermine the institution of
property, so property ownership rules necessarily should be brightline rules with clear answers.
The best approach for a distribution rule for community
property at divorce is to offer clean, simple guidance1 62 to couples
exiting and entering marriages: in the event of a divorce,
community assets and liabilities will be identified and valued, and
the value will be split right down the middle, with decision-makers
maintaining large flexibility concerning the direction of the
particular assets. With that notice, an equal split of the community
worth in every case is hardly inequitable.

160. Id.
161. BLUMBERG, supra note 1, at 27-28.
162. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at § 4.09, Reporter's Notes cmt. c ("Equal
division . .. has ... the significant advantage of simplicity in administration.")

